报告题目：Dynamic Resource Allocation in a Tullock Tug-of-war

　　主讲：郑捷

　　主持：杜创

　　时间：2022年9月20日星期二16:00--17:30

　　线下：西城区月坛北小街2号2号楼201会议室

　　线上：腾讯会议号 658-315-104，密码：0920

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　　报告简介:

　　We consider a Tullock tug-of-war contest, in which two players dynamically allocate resources across stages subject to their budget constraint, and each stage is a battle with a Tullock contest success function. The whole contest consists of potentially infinitely many stages, and the contest is over if and only if one player wins n more battles than the other player. We construct a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and provide closed-form solutions for players' strategies and winning probabilities. Both players' best responses in any state are to allocate the same proportion of present endowment as their opponent, thus the ratio of their endowment remains unchanged during any specific game. The results are robust where there exists a minimum score requirement. We allow for asymmetric scenarios in terms of both budget and winning target.

　　作者简介：

　　郑捷，清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士，现为清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授，博士生导师。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编，Research in Economics副编。

　　研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和参照依赖、自我控制、互惠合作等行为问题，通过运用理论和实验相结合的分析手段研究不完全信息环境下的个体决策、多方博弈、市场均衡。主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优“评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。

　　（编辑：熊晨玮；审校：张佶烨）